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Congress, the President, the Postmaster General, and much of
the American public are currently choosing sides in a debate that may
radically alter the course of the U.S. Post Office. Concern is
prompted primarily by the size of the annual Post Office deficit and
the reasons behind it.
Many feel that the best answer to Post Office problems lies in
reorganization in the form of a government corporation. It is this
basic question of reorganization that will be the major concern of this
presentation. This issue will be examined from two directions. The
bulk of the study will contrast the corporate form of organization with
the present Cabinet level structure. Postal history, a recent report
on Post Office organization, and current proposed legislation will be
examined. Attention will then be shifted to a brief consideration of
a privately operated Post Office. My intent in approaching the ques-
tion from this second direction is not to conclusively establish the
desirability of either public or private operation, but rather to
suggest that such a question does exist, to prompt additional research
into this area, and to suggest some possibilities for the future.
In pursuing the basic question of reorganization, the folli
ing additional issues will be examined:
- ow-

1. How efficiently is the Post Office now being operated?
2. Is the Post Office essentially a business enterprise, a
public service, or some combination of the two?
3. What is the nature of the postal deficit?
4. Should the deficit be financed through the general income
tax structure or should steps be taken to remove the
deficit and make the postal service self-sustaining?
In investigating these issues the focus will be on a broad view
of management problems rather than a detailed examination of any par-
ticular problem. To this end, statistics will be used only inasmuch as
they help to support the point being made.
Chapter II traces postal history from its inception to the mid-
sixties and shows the development of a proud and dedicated service.
Also shown, however, is an almost continuous concern with operating and
financial problems.
Chapter III begins with a look at the Post Office as seen by
former Postmaster General Lawrence F. O'Brien. It ends with the view
of the President's Commission on Postal Organization. The two views
are directly linked. O'Brien was the first to publicly suggest reor-
ganization in a corporate structure. President Johnson established
the Commission as a result of that suggestion and charged it with
investigating organizational forms best suited to improving Post Office
operations
.
Chapter IV examines some of the legislative proposals that have
arisen as a result of the findings and recommendations of the Presi-
dent's Commission. The treatment centers on the two bills presently
being debated in the House of Representa tives--H.R . 4, which proposes

reform within the present Cabinet structure, and H.R. 11750, which
supports the corporation concept.
Chapter V switches to a brief consideration of private opera-
tion. As noted earlier, no attempt is made to justify either private
or public operation. Instead, the question is submitted for further
investigation. The chapter highlights some aspects of postal service
in which the private sector seems eager to compete.
Chapter VI returns to a consideration of the basic research
question and of the underlying issues relating to it. Again the dual
approach to the basic question is used. Conclusions relative to the
corporation versus cabinet question are well supported by previous
chapters. The conclusion on the public versus private issue is neither
well defined nor well supported. Nevertheless, it is included because
I feel it is a point that must be considered and on which additional




Founding and Original Purpose
The history of postal service logically dates to the develop-
ment of the art of writing. Quite naturally, once man had learned to
write, he wished to communicate his writings to others. Except in the
case of his family and closest neighbors this desire entailed a delivery
service. As the Greek, Persian and Roman empires developed, the postal
mode was the only means of long distance communications available. As
such, it played an essential part in the political and military well-
being of these nations. In the Middle Ages rapidly expanding commerce
and learning made communications vital. Again postal service was the
only method available.
The transition from the individual communications mentioned
above to the concept of carrying mail from several senders to several
receivers appears to have first arisen in thirteenth century France
where it was run by merchant associations in cooperation with the
State. This service spread quickly throughout Europe and over the
next few centuries all European countries established similar systems.
It was from the English system thus formed that the U.S. mail service
was started.
^
-Report of the President's Commission on Postal Organization
,
Frederick R. Kappel, chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1968), Annex III, Sec. 1.2, p. 1.7.

The English system had been nationalized in the late sixteenth
century to protect English political and commercial interests. It
became a monopoly in the early seventeenth century to protect what had
become a money making enterprise for the Crown. Little attempt was
made to set up a postal system in the American colonies probably because
such a venture was viewed as a sure loss. After the colonies had estab-
lished systems of their own, however, England seized them and estab-
lished a colonial postal monopoly in 1692. This was not so much an
attempt to increase revenue as it was to retain political control of
the colonies. This system expanded rather slowly and uneconomically
until 1753 when Benjamin Franklin and William Hunter were appointed
Joint Deputy Postmasters for North America.
Franklin introduced several innovations and efficiencies which
put postal service on a much more effective and reliable footing. Even
under Franklin, however, the system was not immune to criticism from
the colonists. Perhaps its major weakness was that it was British at
a time when anything with that label was unpopular. Another major
complaint came from newspapermen. Under the British system the local
postmaster was usually the editor of one of the local newspapers. This
arrangement inevitably led to preferential treatment of that newspaper
over all others. This situation reached the point that it took less
than six months for William Goddard (a prominent newspaperman) to gain
acceptance and set up a reliable independent colonial system which
stretched from Casco Bay in Maine to Williamsburg, Virginia. This
1 Ibid., p. 1.8.
Ward L. Miner, William Goddard, Newspaperman (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1962), pp. 111-136.

service was in effect more than six months before the Declaration of
Independence and no doubt carried a good deal of correspondence vital
to the formulation of that document.
In July of 1775 the Continental Congress took over both the
British and the colonial systems and appointed Franklin (who had lost
his British position because he sided with the colonists) as the first
Postmaster General. Ratification of the Constitution in 1789 provided
in Article 1, Section 8 that:
The Legislature of the United States shall have the power . .
. to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states . . . (and) to establish post offices and
post-roads .
Although the postal organization remained essentially unchanged under
the Constitution this choice of words is noteworthy. It appears that
the Constitutional Convention viewed the Post Office as an adjunct to
commerce. Its original placement in the Treasury Department further
supports the view that the Convention was primarily interested in an
efficient revenue producing organization.
Pre- 1900 Years
The first fifty years of its existence (1790-1840) saw tremen-
dous growth in the Post Office. The number of post offices increased
from 75 to 13,468; the miles of post-roads grew from 1,875 to 155,739;
and receipts rose from $37,935 to $4,539,265. Much of this growth is
directly attributable to the energies and resourcefulness of the first
Postmaster General, Samuel Osgood, and his able successor, Timothy
Pickering. Osgood identified and tried to correct such problems as
President's Commission, Annex III, Sec. 1.2, p. 1.11.

inadequate rate structure for various types of mail, competition by
various stage drivers and private postriders, political patronage in
appointing postmasters, and loss of revenue under the existing system
which had the receiver of the letter liable for postage. In this last
area he estimated about 50 per cent of the revenue was lost either
through refusal of the letter by the intended recipient or by pocket-
ing of the money by the carriers. His foresight in these areas even-
tually led to legislative establishment of the Post Office monopoly
(on most mail) and the abolishment of the C.O.D. system in favor of
pre-paid postage stamps (1847). Unfortunately, political patronage
and a questionable rate, structure plague the system to some extent
even today.
By 1814 Postmaster General Gideon Granger (1801-1814) had
turned the Post Office into the largest single business operation in
the United States His administration was so efficient in turning a
profit that President Jefferson seriously considered earmarking the
"postal profits" as a means of paying off the national debt!
The first half of the nineteenth century saw such developments
as severance from Treasury and establishment of a separate Cabinet
position for the Postmaster General (1829), declaring canals (1836)
and railroads (1838) as official "post-roads," and transcontinental
mail (1848). The picture was not all rosy however. During the early
1830' s Postmaster General William T. Barry managed to run the system
into financial distress. Contractors were not being paid and the Post
1Arthur E. Summer field, U.S. Mail (New York: Holt, Rinchart
and Winston, 1960), p. 39.

8Office had to go to commercial banks for loans. Proof that this was
the result of the man and not the system was found when Barry was
replaced by Amos Kendall in 1835. In less than two years Kendall paid
off all debts, improved service and created a $780,000 surplus in the
Treasury accounts.
In mid-century the expanding lands to the west brought a change
in Post Office philosophy. The postal system soon became a prime means
of unifying the country and fostering its commerce. It was this back-
ground that finalized legislation creating a "postal monopoly" and
created the concept of the Post Office as an agency of public service.
Latter nineteenth century events included street letter boxes
(1858), city delivery service (1863), uniform letter rates regardless
of distance (1863)
,
postal money orders (1864) , and rural delivery ser-
vice (1896). This period also saw the short but colorful life of the
Pony Express. Founded to improve service to the west, this mode of
transportation of the mails served successfully for eighteen months
until the railroads reached the west coast and took over the service.
By the turn of the century, the Post Office provided essentially the
same services we know today, with the exception of parcel post. Unfor-
tunately, inefficiencies had also crept into the system. There were
48 recorded deficit years between 1838 and 1899! Despite the original
intent at revenue production the Post Office was well on its way to






Annex I, Sec. 1.1, p. 9.
3 Ibid. , Annex III, Sec. 1.2, p. 1.11.

1900-1960 Develo pments
The early twentieth century is perhaps best described as the
era of the public service outlook for the Post Office. It was viewed
as being of high social value and importance and having as its main
function the communication of intelligence. Because of this outlook
there was little attempt in the early years to establish rates that
covered costs for all classes. Deficit financing had high public
acceptance (in regard to the Post Office) at the turn of the century.
There appeared to be "little harm in imposing a small general tax in
order to offset a slight difference between receipts and expenditures."
Even today, when the "general tax" is no longer small and the "differ-
ence" is no longer slight, there are many who strongly support this
"public service" aspect above all else.
There were only two major new services originated during the
2
1900-1960 period. A postal savings system was initiated in 1911 and
a parcel post service, including insurance and C.O.D., was started in
1913. Neither of these services enjoy the protection of the "postal
monopoly" and thus compete directly with private enterprise. This
competition is justified in the interest of greater convenience to the
customer. Attempts at extending Post Office control to telephone and
telegraph services were never successful. The last of several such
attempts failed of Congressional approval in 1913. Even though many
foreign postal services do incorporate these services, it is not sur-
prising that this system never met approval here. After all, at the
l ll. T. Newcomb, The Postal Deficit (Washington, D.C.: Wm.
Ballantyne and Sons, 1900), pp. 8-10.
'This service was discontinued in 1966.
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time it was considered, the telephone and telegraph companies were
making money while the Post Office, which had started out as a profit
maker, was by then accepted as a public service running at what was
considered an acceptable loss. This was explicit recognition of the
principle that a government should only undertake those services
which the private sector is unable to efficiently provide. Any "pub-
lic service" aspects of the telephone and telegraph functions were
felt better regulated than operated.
For the remainder of this period the emphasis was on improved
service. Notev/orthy in this regard was the first air mail service in
1918 and the adoption of the "airlift" concept for all first class mail
on a space available basis in 1953.
Perhaps the first incident which brought public awareness of
Post Office financial problems was the cut back to once a day delivery
in 1950. This was announced as a temporary measure, but has now been
in effect for twenty years!
In 1953 Arthur E. Summerfield became Postmaster General. He
inherited a system with cash transactions of $20 billion per year and
not one certified public accountant on the payroll. Financial reports
were hardly a management tool since they were some seventeen months
behind current transactions. The organizational structure had some
40,000 postmasters reporting directly to Washington. At the Department
level there was no research and development, no mechanization study,
and no training program. Despite sweeping reforms that earned Summer-
field the title "Father of the Modern Post Office," many of these
areas are still targets of criticism.
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Summer fie Id also recognized the importance of the human factor
in Post Office efficiency. His elevation of the personnel function to
the assistant secretary level was the first such move within the Govern-
ment, although industry had taken that step many years before. Unfor-
tunately the sincerity of his desire to help postal employees was always
suspect because of the political climate that produced five Presidential
postal pay raise vetos during his tenure.
Summerfield deplored the postal deficit and felt that the Post
Office could and should pay its own way. He recognized however that
this could not be done as long as there was such a large degree of Con-
gressional control and influence by lobbying groups of large mailers
.
Unfortunately this control and influence remains today.
The Postal Policy Act of 1958 was an attempt by Congress to
acquire the better parts of two different worlds. In it they specif-
ically declared that the Post Office was a public service and not a
business. Nonetheless they went on to say that it should be a self-
supporting endeavor and that each class of mail should as far as pos-
sible carry all costs associated with it. As will be shown later
there is much debate over this business versus public service question
and over the public service portion of the postal deficit.
1960's
J. Edward Day was President Kennedy's appointee as Postmaster
General. This selection was important in at least one major respect.






career postal official to head the Post Office Department- - every Presi-
dent for the thirty years prior to Day's appointment had appointed the
national chairman of his party. Often these men continued to hold that
position also and devoted considerable time to it, using the Post Office
as merely a political platform. Day's selection was seen by many as
the beginning of the end of the patronage system. Unfortunately this
hope was premature. As Day himself quickly found out, the Post Office
was still the source of political rewards. The only change was that
they were not handled by the Democratic National Chairman but by Bobby
Kennedy, the Attorney General. Day properly fell into line and
devoted his time to improving day to day operations (with the neglect
of deeper problems). His major contributions were the introduction of
ZIP codes and the Accelerated Business Collection and Delivery (ABCD)
systems for faster routing of intracity mail.
After the relatively quiet tenure of John A. Gronouski, the
system got the strong jolt it needed when Lawrence F. O'Brien was
seated as Postmaster General. In the space of his two and a half year
tour of duty, O'Brien managed to convince many of the right people
that t,he Post Office in its present form was a system of "no control"
and that neither he nor anyone else could effectively manage it. His
suggested solution was the formation of a government owned corporation
to run the postal service. It was O'Brien's bold stand on these issues
'-J. Edward Day, My Appointed Round (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965), pp. 8-9.

13
which led to the formation of the so called "Kappel Commission,"
which will be studied in Chapter III, and to the subsequent legisla-
tion which is now pending in Congress.
Popularly referred to as the "Kappel Commission" in honor
of its chairman, this commission is properly titled "The President's
Commission on Postal Organization."

CHAPTER III
O'BRIEN, KAPPEL AND THE TVA
Postmaster General O'Brien
Lawrence F. O'Brien was certainly not the first Postmaster
General to seek (and in some cases attain) a better postal service.
Neither was he the first to suggest a change in Post Office organiza-
tion. His contribution was to recognize that unless the entire system
was reorganized, day-to-day improvements were not likely to solve deep
seated problems, nor, in his opinion, even allow the service to con-
tinue. It was a lack of management control that O'Brien saw as the
root of Post Office problems. This "no control" phenomena is best
summed up in his 1967 exchange with the chairman of the House Postal
Appropriations Subcommittee:
Mr. Steed: General . . . would this be a fair summary: that at
the present time, as the manager of the Post Office Depart-
ment, you have no control over your workload, you have no
control over your rates of revenue, you have no control over
the pay rates of the employees that you employ, you have very
little control over the conditions of the service of those
employees, you have virtually no control, by the nature of it,
of your physical facilities, and you have only a limited con-
trol, at best, over the transportation facilities that you are
compelled to use- -all of which adds up to a staggering amount of
"no control" in terms of the duties you have to perform. . . .
Mr. O'Brien: Mr. Chairman, I would have to generally agree with
your premise . . . that is a staggering list of "no control."
I don't know _/whether/ it has ever been put that succinctly





Later, in that same year, O'Brien had reached the conclusion
that "no human being can efficiently manage the nation's postal service
as it is now constituted." He went on to suggest that the best way
out was to remove the Post Office from the Cabinet and set it up as a
government corporation. The importance of investigating this concept
was rapidly conveyed to President Johnson who, by Executive Order 11341
of April 8, 1969, established the President's Commission on Postal
Organization to examine the postal service. O'Brien left office in
late April 1968, shortly before the Commission published its final
report
.
2Since returning to private life, O'Brien has been busy gath-
ering support and speaking throughout the country on behalf of the
Commission's recommendations and resultant proposed legislation.
Recently he helped form the Citizens Committee for Postal Reform.
He and former U.S. Senator Thruston B. Morton ace the National Co-
Chairman of this Washington based organization which was established
to lobby for total postal service reform in the form of a government
owned corporation.
The Kappel Commission
Inception, Composition, and Methodology
As noted earlier, the President's Commission on Postal Organ-
ization (commonly called the Kappel Commission) was created on April 8,
Lawrence F. O'Brien, Remarks before the American Society of
Magazine Editors and Magazine Publishers Association, Washington, D.C.,
April 3, 1967.




1967 by an executive order from President Johnson. Its task was to
conduct an extensive review of the American postal service and in par-
ticular to "determine whether the postal system as presently organized
is capable of meeting the demands of our growing economy and our
expanding population." To pursue this work the President appointed
the following men to the commission:
Frederick R. Kappel-- Chairman
Chairman, Board of Directors (retired)
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
George P. Baker
Dean, Harvard University
Graduate School of Business Administration
David E. Bell
Vice President, The Ford Foundation
Fred J. Borch
President, General Electric Company
David Ginsburg
Partner, Ginsburg and Feldman
Ralph Lazarus
Chairman, Board of Directors, Federated Department Stores
George Meany
President, AF of L and CIO
J. Irwin Miller
Chairman, Board of Directors, Cummins Engine Company
W. Beverly Murphy
President, Campbell Soup Company
Rudolph A. Peterson
President, Bank of America
Murray Comarow--Executive Director
Executive Director of the Federal Power Commission
Faced with a one year deadline, the Commission decided to
assemble a small staff and to let contracts to major consulting firms
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to develop needed information. The major emphasis in all studies per-
formed was on the general problem of organization and management of the
postal service. The specific approach taken was to use a large general
consulting firm to study every facet of the system and to couple this
with additional contracts to consultants with special knowledge in the
five major areas of study (personnel administration, financial manage-
ment, rates and ratemaking, the nature and mix of postal services, and
postal technology). Commissioners and staff assistants worked closely
with all contractors as their reports developed.
In addition to the contractors, the commission made use of per-
sonal interviews, visits, and public hearings. Interviews were held
with top Post Office officials, officials of other government corpora-
tions, numerous Congressmen, and leaders of all postal unions. Many
leaders in the business and academic worlds also submitted written
views to the commission.
Visits were made to post offices throughout the country, to
companies with operations similar to those of the Post Office, and to
large mail users. At the Commission's hearings, the views of all par-
ties interested in postal affairs were actively solicited. Among those
testifying were union officials, individual employees, mail user's
associations, publisher's groups and private mailing services. A
"Notice of Inquiry" was printed in the Federal Register and also dis-
tributed directly to 147 labor organizations, businesses, charitable
groups and similar organizations. This notice described the work of
Report of the President's Commission on Postal Organization
,
Frederick R. Kappel, chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1968), p. 194.

18
the Commission and provided a general list of issues to which answers
were being sought.
Findings of the Commission
The complete findings of the Kappel Commission are published in
its final report, entitled Towards Postal Excellence . Detailed back-
ground for those findings is found in the contractor's reports which
are published as separate annexes to the final report. The findings
are categorized in three basic areas: quality of service, circumstance
of employment, and postal finances.
Quality of Service
The basic Commission finding in this area is that the Post
Office does not have a reliable means of estimating customer satisfac-
tion. Until recently it conducted no market surveys and based its
quality rating almost exclusively on the number of complaints it
received.
Although delays in delivery, erroneous deliveries, damaged par-
cels, and lost magazines are a daily occurrence throughout the system,
the average household appears satisfied with the service it receives.
The error rate seems low enough that the vast majority of individuals
are not often subjected to inconvenience of any magnitude. The basic
attitude seems to be that six cents buys fairly reliable two to three
day service anywhere in the country and that such a standard is quite
acceptable
.
In households that are heavy mailers and especially in busi-
nesses the story was different. These mailers frequently rely on
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dependable mail service and suffer financial losses if that expectation
is not met. The Post Office has recently inaugurated a series of con-
ferences with its heaviest mailers to discuss problems of service, but
the situation is still a long way from solution.
Aside from day to day inadequacies, there is the question of
what Larry O'Brien referred to as the Post Office's "race with catas-
trophe." This phrase envisions regional or perhaps even total break-
down of the entire postal system under the weight of ever increasing
mail volume. Dealing as it does with the future, the Commission's
conclusions here are indecisive. Several local breakdowns are cited,
the most publicized one being that which occurred in Chicago in 1966.
On that occasion, breakdowns in physical plant and management authority
crippled the world's largest single postal facility. Over ten million
pieces of mail were backlogged for nearly three weeks before the situ-
ation was cleared up with the help of a special Departmental task
e 1force
.
These major breakdowns are rare, however, and complete collapse
of the system is not foreseen. Even under the heaviest estimates of
volume increase, the postal service will not require a significantly
o
greater portion of federal funds or personnel. It is also conceded
that early warning systems now being implemented by the Post Office
will do much to prevent the recurrence of "Chicago- type" disasters.
A major cause of both day to day service delays and of more
serious breakdowns is the "daily peak" problem. Because of the
Ibid
.







tendency of businesses to deposit all their mail late in the day, most
mail must be processed by the Post Office during relatively brief time
spans in the evenings at one end and in the early morning at the other.
While there are numerous factors which account for this problem, the
Commission attributes most of the blame to the Department's goal of
"next day delivery" for all first class mail. The concern is that this
goal may be unnecessarily costly to the system as a whole. Senders of
first class mail do not necessarily need overnight delivery of all
their mail. Much of it is not urgent and a dependable normal service
of two, three, or four days would suit their needs. On the other
hand, some of it is urgent and one day service is desired in those
cases. By treating both segments of first class mail the same, the
intended goal is never reached. Only 71 per cent is actually delivered
the next day whether urgent or not.
A possible solution appears to be the adoption of a divided
first class structure in which only urgent mail would get overnight
service. All other mail would get normal service, hopefully on a more
dependable basis since the peak volume period could be more evenly
spread throughout the working day. Those who desired the special over-
night service would of course have to pay some additional charge.
During a recent interview, Postmaster General Winton M. Blount went
on record as favoring this type system which, he noted, has met with
o
great success in England.
This was the finding of Arthur D. Little, Inc. through a
limited market survey run for the Commission.
2
"Blount Would Adopt Britain's Tuo-Tier Mail Plan," The




The Kappel Commission found conditions in the personnel area
of far more concern than the aspects of inadequate service just dis-
cussed. Here they found the Post Office employing 716,000 employees
under conditions far below the standards in private industry. From the
time he applies for a job to the time he retires (or quits) the indi-
vidual employee is subjected to archaic recruiting and selection pro-
cesses, political interference, lack of training, poor promotion
opportunities, erratic work schedules, and poor work environment.
Present selection processes are a combination of Civil Service
and Post Office regulations. The red tape involved in the procedure
results in a lapse of thirteen or more weeks between the initial appli-
cation and the actually hiring (or job offering) . In a recent Post
Office study, it was found that 67 per cent of those finally offered
jobs refused them. The main reasons given were that they had gotten
other employment in the meantime, or that the job offered (usually a
o
substitute position) was unattractive. Thus, the personnel office
devotes a great deal of time to processing applications for people
that are never hired.
Politics has always been a big factor in the personnel picture
of the Post Office. As noted earlier, the Postmaster General has fre-
quently been the national chairman of his party and has often continued
to hold that office while carrying out his Post Office duties. Most of









stone. Thus the median tenure in office during this century has been
only thirty-one months. This discontinuity of leadership is cited by
the Commission as one of postal management's most serious problems.
The Deputy Postmaster General, the six assistant Postmasters
General and the General Counsel are also Presidential political appoin-
tees, although there is heavy evidence that ability rather than politi-
cal influence is the major factor in most cases. The remaining top
level figure, the Chief Inspector, is named by the Postmaster General.
Theoretically, 1938 marked a great improvement in the appoint-
ing of postmasters. In that year legislation was passed that gave
postmasters Civil Service status upon Senate confirmation of their
appointment. There was of course still the initial appointment to
contend with, but postmasters, once appointed, no longer had to submit
their resignations upon the arrival of a new administration. The
filling of vacancies is now handled by an "Advisor" system. The
advisor is a political figure of some description knowledgeable in
the geographical area of the vacancy (e.g., a local Congressman, Sena-
tor, Governor, or state or county chairman). Despite various qualifi-
cation criteria, an aggressive advisor can almost always succeed in
getting his selectee approved. It is to the credit of some advisors
that they do not wield their power in the selection process and instead
ask the Post Office to select the best men for the job.
Further damaging the postmaster setup is a strict residency








area of the post office with the vacancy. This requirement severely
limits the number of applicants in many small jurisdictions and, more
importantly, blocks the transfer of a successful postmaster to a posi-
tion in a larger city.
The selection of rural carriers follows a similar patronage
process. These appointments are actively sought since they are nor-
mally part time responsibilities paying well above the median income
in the areas they serve.
A more subtle aspect of political influence occurs in the
labor-management relations area. Here the Post Office guidelines are
those of all federal agencies and are contained in Executive Order
2
10988. This order was undoubtedly a step in the right direction since
it was the first formal pronouncement of a federal policy on labor-
management cooperation, but it fell short in the Post Office because
the most vital items were not negotiable. Thus, with issues such as
pay, hours, and job descriptions within the purview of Congress rather
than the Post Office Department, its 620,000 (87.5 per cent) unionized
members prefer to deal directly with Congress. Union leaders have
developed into highly skilled lobbyists rather than union negotiators.
Although millions are spent on training each year, the program
is inadequately managed and too widely decentralized. Less than one
day per employee per year is devoted to training and about half of
*-While political patronage in the selection of postmasters
and rural carriers was a finding of the "Kappel Commission" it should
be noted that Postmaster General Blount has announced his intent to
eliminate this system.
2Replaced by Executive Order 11491, effective January 1, 1970,
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that time is on the employee's own time. The amount of training
varies from post office to post office running from virtually none to
adequate. Quality of training follows a similar continuum. Since the
Kappcl Commission, steps have been taken to improve the training situa-
tion but it is still considered a major problem. With an annual turn-
over of close to 200,000 employees, such a problem can hardly be
regarded lightly. The establishment of the Postal Service Institute
(January, 1968) to supervise a centralized and standardized program
of training was a major step in the right direction.
The present promotion system within the Post Office acts almost
as a bar to incentive. About 85 per cent of all postal employees are
in the lowest 5 pay levels with a top annual pay of about $8,100 (level
5 with 21 years of service) . Eight cf ten leave the service at the
same level at which they started. Many promotions to supervisory
positions are turned down because the small addition in pay is not
felt adequate compensation for the added responsibility assumed. A
loss of seniority at the new level also results in assignment to less
desirable working schedules. Residency requirements and political
influence at the postmaster level further restrict incentive.
A seniority system for selection of working schedules has made
the already pressing peak volume problem even worse. The twenty- four
3hour work day is divided into three basic tours:
President's Commission
,







Tour 1--12:00 midnight to 8:00 AM (mostly to process incoming
mail)
Tour 2-- 8: 00 AM to 4:00 PM (processing low priority mail and
delivering mail)
Tour 3--4:00 PM to 12:00 midnight (processing outgoing mail)
Tour 3 is the busiest, followed in order by tour 1 and 2. Senior
employees have their choice of schedules and chose the daylight tour
by a wide margin. Obviously this leaves the least experienced people
working at the busiest times. Substitute and temporary employees are
particularly susceptible to being assigned to tour 1 or tour 3 and to
being given fluctuating and uncertain schedules. It is little wonder
that their turnover rate is so high (32 per cent for career substi-
tutes and 90 per cent for temporaries) when compared with the 9 per
cent figure for career regulars.
A final point for consideration is that of postal physical
working conditions. Aside from productivity factors such as inade-
quate room and equipment, complaints are frequently voiced by employ-
ees about inadequate lighting, inadequate heating, lack of air con-
ditioning, lack of sanitation in eating areas and inadequate and
unsanitary rest room facilities. While this may appear to be a list
compiled by any group of employees, the difference is that in the
Post Office it is all true. Many active post offices were built in
the 1930's or before and suffer all the ills of any forty year old
building. The Raleigh, North Carolina building is ninety years old




and indoor toilets. Despite a rise in the number of female employees
2
many post offices have no toilet facilities for women.
The railroad was the primary mail carrier during the years when
these post offices were constructed. Consequently, they were built in
downtown areas which, in most cities, have become less than desirable
places to work. With the persistent rise in street crime prevalent
in almost all our cities, the situation is particularly troublesome to
women employees at night. During the winter months, all three tours
must do some travelling during hours of darkness.
Postal finances
It is in the area of finance that the "no control" phenomena
alluded to earlier is most prevalent. Management is so diffused by
the present system that one of the Commission's contractors insists
that a clear distinction be drawn between the terms Post Office Depart-
ment and Postal Complex. The former term refers to the Executive
Department only, while the* latter includes all agencies who together
with the Post Office Department actually manage the postal service.-^
The Postal Complex includes Congress, The Civil Service Commission,
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Bureau of the Budget, the Treasury, the General Accounting Office
and the General Services Administration. After briefly noting the
area of control of each of the other participants, the discussion
N.Y. Times Magazine
,
November 3, 1968, p. 35.
2 Ibid.
3This distinction is used by Arthur D. Little, Inc.
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here will concentrate on Congress since it has ultimate control over
all financial functions.
The Civil Service Commission has no direct control influence
on postal finances. As noted earlier, its concern is with the regula-
tions which govern Post Office recruiting, skill differentiations and
the like.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) certifies the eligibility of
carriers to transport air mail. This certification is normally limited
to scheduled airlines operating between major cities. To fill existing
gaps in this service the CAB has recently begun authorizing "air taxi"
service between smaller cities and towns. The rate of compensation to
the carrier is also set by the CAB.
The influence of the Interstate Commerce Commission on mail by
rail is similar to that of the CAB, but with the decline of the use of
railway mail service, its impact is lessening. The major issue now is
probably that of the rail service itself. The ICC makes continuous
efforts to persuade the Post Office Department to make more use of this
mode. The ICC also controls the rate setting for fourth class mail,
but this control has been merely statutory in nature with the ICC going
along with Post Office recommendations in all cases.
Hie General Services Administration is charged with the
responsibility of managing and maintaining all federal buildings and
with establishing regulations for procuring, maintaining and disposing
of government property. In many cases the property regulations pub-
lished severely restrict the flexibility of Post Office management.
President's Commission
,
Annex III, p. 3-12
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Their building standards add substantially to cost without any special
concern for the unique requirements of postal facilities.
The General Accounting Office's role is quite narrow. It func-
tions as a Congressional "watchdog" for all government agencies and
gets into the actual financial management area only in an advisory
capacity except in cases of flagrant violations of good management
practices
.
The U.S. Treasury foots the annual Post Office deficit. Reve-
nues produced through postal operation are paid into a Postal Fund in
the Treasury but are not available for use by the Post Office. All
operating expenses must be appropriated through Congressional action.
The difference between revenue and expense is paid from the Treasury
as the postal deficit.
The Bureau of the Budget provides a link between the Post
Office Department and the Congress. Early in the budget cycle its
role is advisory. Essentially it informs the Post Office how much is
"likely to fly" this year. Later it enters a fiscal phase. Here the
proposed Post Office budget must compete with the budgets of all other
agencies and must be weighed for its impact on the overall fiscal
policy desires of the President. Once the final budget gets to Con-
gress the BOB assumes a role of advocate for each agency's budget.
Congressional influence ranges from broad policy decisions to
concern for day to day postal operations. Indeed as a federal agency
the Post Office Department owes its very existence to Congressional
legislation. Any proposed new activity must first be authorized by
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Congress. Even then, of course, it can't be undertaken until funds are
appropriated through separate legislation.
Through the budget process, Congress controls all Post Office
operating funds. As is the case when BOB is preparing the budget, Con-
gress attempts to concern itself with a wide range of national priori-
ties when dealing with appropriations. This concern has constantly
hurt the capital budgeting aspect of the Post Office. When faced with
a need to cut the budget, Congressmen inevitably favor day to day opera-
tions over capital expansion. This short sighted approach has pushed
modernization of the Post Office far behind its own desires. Estimates
at the time of the Kappel Commission placed the required figure for
needed capital improvements at $5.4 billion. In an attempt to keep
up with its need, the Post Office has undertaken a large leasing program.
The annual leasing figure has had a great deal more success in Congress
than the large lump sum construction figures previously attempted. The
lease versus buy decision is never an easy one, but should be undertaken
on the basis of expediency only in extreme cases. Apparently the Post
Office feels it has reached this extreme. A recent estimate places the
annual leasing costs at 11.1 per cent of the total cost of the facili-
ties themselves (design and site included). Even in today's tight
money market the cost of borrowing is well below that figure.
Aside from its budgetary controls, the Congress also exerts
major influences in rate setting and employee compensation. With the
exception of parcel post (an ICC concern) , Congress controls the postage
Ibid
.
, Annex I, part 3, p. 26.
2 Ibid. , Annex I, part 3, p. 170,
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rates on all mail. Although the basic intent is to equate cost and
revenue, the long history of postal deficits shows that this ideal has
not often been realized. The important point, however, is that Con-
gress, and not the Post Office, controls the major source of postal
revenue
.
Postal pay rates are also controlled by Congress. With between
75 per cent and 80 per cent of Post Office costs going to payroll and
related benefits, this gives Congress control of the major postal
expense item also.
The combination of influences exercised by the postal complex
has left the Post Office in a position where, instead of managing, it
administers policies, rates, and procedures established by others.
This condition is seen by the Kappel Commission as the main reason for
the present postal deficit.
Foreign systems
As a part of its work, the Kappel Commission conducted a lim-
ited study of foreign postal experience. The intent of that study was
to determine their degree of economic or business orientation. Four-
o
teen systems were studied and the conclusion reached was that the






Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and Japan.
President's Commission, p. 183
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Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany were espe-
cially business oriented in organization. Since the Commission's
report Great Britain has made its postal service a government corpora-
tion. West Germany has a similar proposal under consideration. The
Swedish Post Office is run by a board of directors. All the other
countries have a single permanent professional who reports to his
political body only for general policy guidelines.
Twelve of the fourteen operate completely from their revenues
and cover, in addition to normal expenses, some sort of return on capi-
9
tal invested. These twelve countries do have subsidized classes of
mail but prefer to make up those losses from other classes rather than
resort to tax revenue.
Rate setting in all countries except Canada is more of an
administrative procedure than a political struggle. In general rates
are set to cover costs. In those countries that do require approval
by some sort of political body, the procedure is largely perfunctory.
Politicians appear content not to meddle in their postal system so
long as it covers costs and does not act to arouse public complaints.
Recommendations of the Kappel Commission
After completing its study, the Kappel Commission submitted a
report with five major recommendations:
This change was effected in October 1969 and is therefore too
new to evaluate. It should be remembered however that the British Post
Office includes telephone and telegraph services.
2Our system does not provide a charge for capital investment.
•^President ' s Commission
, p . 1 85 .
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1. A Postal Corporation owned entirely by the Federal Government
should be chartered by Congress to operate the postal service
on a self-supporting basis.
2. The Corporation should take immediate steps to improve the
quality of service, and the physical conditions under which
postal employees work.
3. Political patronage should be abolished.
4. A] 1 present employees should be transferred with their accrued
Civil Service benefits to a new career service within the
Corporation
.
5. Rates should be set by the Corporation's governing body after
hearings by expert Rate Commissioners, but should be subject
to veto by a concurrent resolution of Congress.
Recommendation 1
The proposal to establish a Postal Corporation is, of course,
the most basic of the five and provides the framework for all the others
It rests on two critical assumptions and at least one major Commission
prejudice. The assumptions are that the postal service is a business
rather than a public service and that the "public service" portions of
the postal deficit are presently greatly overstated. The prejudice is
that all but three of the Commissioners were highly successful business-
men. One of these three was the Dean of Harvard Business School and
another a successful lawyer. The only member who was not business
oriented was George Meany and it is interesting to note that he regis-
tered a mild dissent on the corporation recommendation. With the obser-
vation that such a commission, when charged with investigating possible
alternative organizational forms, appears heavily biased toward the
conclusions it reached, this prejudice will be left without further
discussion. The assumptions, however, require additional explanation.
1 Ibid., pp. 1-4.
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The Commission bases most of its argument about the Post Office
being a business on the fact that it provides a service for a price.
This is, in essence, the definition of a service industry. Most people
consider the Post Office a vital service, but the Commission maintains
that it is certainly no more vital than any presently existing public
utility. It is into this class of endeavor that the Post Office should
logically fit. The historical needs of a Post Office to form a united
communications network for the entire country and to subsidize strug-
gling new modes of transportation simply no longer exist.
Furthermore, in the service it does provide, it is heavily
business oriented. Only 14 per cent of all mail involves correspondence
from individual to individual and about half of that figure is made up
of greeting cards. Less than 1 per cent is accounted for by parcels
sent or received by individuals. By contrast, businesses originate
almost 74 per cent of all mail.
Having assumed tha£ the Post Office is a business, the Commis-
sion turns to a consideration of the postal deficit and, in particular,
to the public service portion of that deficit. They first distinguish
the postal deficit from such "deficits" as that of the Justice Depart-
ment, the Department of Defense, etc. These "deficits" (financings of
Government services) can usually be paid for only through general tax
revenues, whereas the Post Office has the ability to raise substantial
revenues from the very services it provides. Its deficit then, is
simply the result of revenues failing to cover costs. Of course, some
of this loss is due to true public services such as reduced rates for
1 Ibid., p. 4!
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churches, the blind, etc. The Commission believes however that the
extent of the public service element in the overall deficit is highly-
overstated .
The fiscal year 1967 figures that were studied showed a deficit
of $1.14 billion. Under present standards, nearly half of that loss
($562 million) was attributed to public service subsidies. In contrast,
the Commission believes the correct figure to be about $240 million.
This discrepancy exists because of a redefinition in the areas of rural
allowance, non-postal services, and special services.
The rural allowance is based on what the Commission believes is
a mistaken concept that rural post offices lose money. While it is
conceded that a strict measurement of cost against revenue will show a
"loss" in many rural areas, the contention is that this "loss" should
be considered a cost of the overall system. The rationale here is that
part of the value of the postal system to a mailer is that it can reach
these rural areas. This element, then, should be considered a subsidy
to the system as a whole rather than a public service allowance to
rural areas.
In addition to its postal functions, the Post Office performs
a number of non-postal services for other Government agencies. Such
services include registration of aliens, selling migratory bird
stamps, and providing space for Civil Service exams. While in most
cases some compensation is made to the Post Office for these services,
1 Ibid., p. 23
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there was a loss of $26 million incurred during fiscal year 1967.
Clearly this element should not appear in any form as part of the Post
Office deficit. If the services offered are such that they warrant
being supplied at a loss, this loss should be borne by the agency
involved j not the Post Office.
At present, special services such as registered mail, special
delivery, C.O.D., etc. are also carried at losses written off as public
services. The Commission attributes part of this loss to faulty
accounting practices, but in any case feels that the reasoning applied
to rural post offices applies equally here. These services are part of
the value of the total system and if they can't break even themselves,
the rest of the system should support them.
Starting with the $562 million originally attributed to public
service losses and subtracting the three elements discussed above
(rural allowance $108 million, non-postal services $26 million, special
services $62 million-5 ) , the Commission is left with a $366 million pub-
lic service subsidy. The method of calculating this figure is disputed
The Post Office uses a "full- loss" method which charges off the differ-
ence between the rate of the subsidized user and the fully allocated
cost of the service. The point of contention is that even normal users
of the mail classes in question do not cover fully allocated costs.
The subsidy amount, then, is more properly calculated by comparing the
The particular practice in question here is the use of the
Cost Ascertainment System. The value of this system has been ques-
tioned since its inception in 1924 but is not a necessary consideration
in this paper and will not be discussed further.
2Ibid
., p. 137. .





normal user's rate with the subsidized rate. Use of this criterion
left the Commission with a total estimated public service figure of
$240 million. This final figure amounts to only 3.8 per cent of Post
Office costs.
Having thus redefined the postal deficit, the Commission goes
on to suggest that the subsidy element be handled in different v/ays
.
Their favored recommendation is that it be entirely eliminated from
Post Office consideration and paid to the institutions benefiting in
the form of a direct subsidy. For instance, with the vast amounts now
going to federal aid to education, why tack on a relatively insignifi-
cant postal subsidy instead of just increasing the basic grant.
Recognizing, however, that the postal subsidy is deeply rooted
in American tradition, the Commission proposes an alternative solution,
It has Congress set the total size of the subsidy and provide general
guidelines on administering it, but leaves the ^ost Office free to set
the specific rate of subsidy. Further, it suggests that the cost of
the subsidy be borne by the general mail user. This recommendation is
justified in the interests of keeping Congressional involvement to a
minimum. Financing through general tax revenues would serve to keep
the door open for such involvement in many other areas. With the
widespread use of postal services, the net result would approximate a
1
general tax in any event.
With these underlying assumptions now clear, a further look at
the Commission's first recommendation is in order. In deciding on the
Government Corporation structure the Commission considered four other
1Ibid. J p. 142
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proposed forms: retention in Cabinet status, a postal agency, a govern-
ment corporation with maximum private participation, and a regulated
private corporation.
Cabinet status was rejected because it would not remove the
influence of the postal complex. Despite the opportunity for much
reform within its present structure, the Post Office would still be
subject to such major restrictions as substantive and appropriations
legislation and Congressional rate-setting.
The agency concept, although concentrating Congressional control
in a "Joint Committee," still lacked complete managerial freedom from
the postal complex. It too was therefore rejected.
The idea of a government corporation with private participation
entails a widespread use of both private capital and private management.
This structure would also entail a major emphasis on contract manage-
ment. It was anticipated that bids would be sought and contracts
awarded in such areas as construction (and possibly maintenance) of
Post Office buildings, operation of sorting and distribution terminals,
and the pickup and forwarding of intercity mail. Fear of the Post
Office becoming a management agency (with a disproportionate amount of
time spent on handling private contractors) in lieu of an operating
agency led the Commission to reject this idea as well.
The final form considered was that of a private regulated cor-
poration. This would place the postal service on the same footing as
existing public utilities such as electric companies and telephone
'•"Options Considered by the Kappel Commission," Congressional
Digest
,




companies. This form found great favor with the Commission but had to
be rejected for a practical reason. It was felt that no private
investor would be willing (or able) to take on the postal service in
its present condition. With estimates of $5 billion needed for capital
improvements and an annual operating loss in excess of $1 billion it
would be hard to quarrel with this conclusion.
The corporation form finally decided on involved management by
a board of directors on a break even basis. It was the intent of the
Commission that the corporation have the power to acquire and dispose
of property in its own name, to be free from the appropriations process
and live within its own revenues on a business-like budget, to borrow
from the public as necessary to finance capital investments, and to set
the rates of pay for its directors and other employees. The specific
organization suggested was a nine man board, with six part-time members
appointed by the President, and three full-time members selected by the
Presidential appointees. One of the latter three would serve as Chair-
man of the Board, and another as Chief Operating Officer of the new
postal service.
The new corporation would be subject to the Government Corpora-
tion Control Act which governs all existing government corporations and
to such government-wide policies as the Hatch Act, Equal Opportunity
Employment, and conflict of interest laws.
Comparisons of the proposed corporation with the Tennessee










of widespread knowledge of the TVA and of its success. In organiza-
tional form, of course, the comparison is quite valid. The same organi-
zational comparison would, however, hold for most of the other twelve
government corporations now chartered. Many of these are lesser known
and not nearly as successful as the TVA.
Two important distinctions exist however. One is a difference
in financing and the other a difference in ideology.
Although the TVA does incorporate many of the tools of modern
business management and is free in many ways from anything approaching
a "TVA complex," it is still subject to the Congressional appropria-
tions process. This is a major departure from the Kappel Commission's
envisioned set up.
The ideological distinction stems from a consideration of the
basic issues involved. The TVA was a question of private versus public
involvement. There were many who fought vigorously for a private
development of the Tennessee Valley. They saw the final adoption of
TVA as "a dagger at the heart of capitalism, free enterprise and the
3
cherished concept of rugged individualism." Also to be noted is that
Bank for Cooperatives, Commodity Credit Corporation, Export-
Import Bank, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Federal
National Mortgage Association, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., Panama Canal Co., St. Lawrence
Seaway Development Corp., and the United States Housing Authority.
2 C. H. Pritchett, The TVA--A Study in Public Administration
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press,
1943), p. 235.
^David E. Lilienthal, TVA- - Democracy on the March (New York:
Harper Brothers, 1953), p. 11.
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TVA is regional in nature and was begun only after years of private
effort failed.
The Post Office is only remotely concerned with the private
versus public consideration. Although private operation is not com-
pletely out of the question, the public nature of the Post Office has
a 2 00 year tradition that will be hard to shake. The basic question
here is the form of public control. Also in contrast is the Post
Office's nationwide service.
Thus while a Post Office- TVA comparison is useful in pointing
out what a government corporation is and especially how it is organ-
ized, the comparison should not go far beyond that point. Certainly
TVA's success can not be any measure of the future of the proposed
Postal Corporation.
Recommendation 2
Better service, improvements in the physical plant, and enhanced
career opportunities for postal employees would, of course, be the goal
under any organizational form. The need in these areas has already
been discussed in the Commission's findings. The important point here
is that the roots of failure have been attributed to the lack of an
effective management system. In the Commission's view, the government
corporation set up is the best practical solution to the "no control"
problem.
Recommendation 3
The political patronage issue has become largely a moot point
since Postmaster General Blount announced his intent to completely
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abolish this practice. Unfortunately Blount hurt his push for the
corporation plan by the method he chose for the patronage shift. Many
Congressmen were alienated when they heard the public announcement
before a word was said to Congress. Reaction was not so much against
the death of patronage as it was against what was viewed as an usurpa-
tion of Congressional prerogatives.
Patronage will no doubt linger for a time, but when it goes
completely, there will be little weeping in Washington. But for a
handful of Congressmen, the system has been strongly opposed for years,
From a practical standpoint the votes gained (or lost) by a political
appointment are just not worth a Congressman's time.
Recommendation 4
The shift of all postal employees to a new federal career ser-
vice is a point that has turned many postal unions against the corpora-
tion plan. An analysis of this opposition will be deferred until
Chapter IV. Here we will consider only a description of the proposed
change
.
The basic intent of the new career service is to sever ties
with Congress on critical employee issues. At the time of transfer,
all accrued Civil Service benefits would be retained by the employee
who transferred. Those that chose not to work for the corporation
would be assisted in obtaining a position elsewhere in the Civil Ser-
vice structure. Initial pay levels would be established in the cor-
poration charter at the levels then existing in the old structure.
After that point the influence of Congress would sharply wane.
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Future pay, benefits, and related issues would become a matter of union-
management negotiation.
A mechanism for third party arbitration (either binding or
advisory) must also be built into the new service. The Commission
allows that a variety of approaches are valid, but suggests that the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)- be used for representation and
unfair labor practice questions, and the Federal Mediation and Concil-
iation Service (FMCS) for major contract questions and pay disputes.
In the event of an impasse, the issue would be referred to the Presi-
dent who would establish whatever ad hoc methods he thought appro-
priate. In the Commission's view the uncertainties built into this
final step would strengthen lower levels of negotiation.
The right to strike was dismissed on two counts. First, the
3disruption of a vital public service could not be permitted. Second,
the conditions of public employment offer enough differential (from
the private sector) in job security as to negate the need for the
right to strike.
Recommendation 5
Again sticking to its intent of removing the Post Office as
much as possible from the postal complex, the Commission proposed that
rates be set by the corporation itself rather than by Congress. This
move would give postal management direct control over its revenues and




Existing public utilities which do have the right to strike are
always subject to federal intervention if such an event does occur.
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make its task of break even operation far simpler. At the same time
it would free Congress from involvement in the intricate details of
determining postal rates.
The mechanism proposed would include an independent panel of
technically proficient Postal Rate Commissioners responsible only to
the corporation's board of directors. When the board foresaw the need
for a change in rates, it would submit its proposal to these commis-
sioners. After evaluating all accounting, engineering, and economic
evidence available, the commissioners would render an opinion to the
board. This opinion would then be accepted, modified, or rejected
and a formal notice of a rate change prepared. To protect public
interests from abuses in rate- setting, Congress would retain the power
to veto the proposed change by concurrent resolutions of both houses.
If the veto were not exercised, the proposed rates would become effec-
tive in sixty days.
Congress would of course outline broad policy guidelines for
postal rates in the corporation's initial charter. These guidelines
would include any subsidized classes the Congress wished to establish
and a total subsidy limit. As noted earlier, this subsidy should be
treated as part of the costs of the total postal service and should,
therefore, be borne by an appropriate rate structure for unsubsidized




Publication of the Kappel Commission report prompted Congres-
sional response in the form of several reform bills. The second ses-
sion of the 90th Congress saw two bills introduced in the Senate and
one in the House of Representatives. The Senate bills laid the
ground work for the struggle that was to follow. S.3726, introduced
by Senator Monroney (D. Okla.), sought reform and modernization within
the present structure, whereas S.4187, presented by Senator Hangen (R
.
Wise.), was more in line with the basic changes suggested by Kappel and
company. The single House effort, H.R. 19981, offered by Representa-
tive Wilson (D. Cal.), sought to obtain bond issuing authority for the
Post Office, while retaining its Cabinet status. Too little time was
available for hearings and debate on these bills. Consequently, no
action was taken in the 90th Congress.
Debate in the 91st Congress is concentrated on the question of
organizational form. Everyone seems convinced that reform is neces-
sary. It is merely the form and extent that are in conflict. Although
both houses have bills under consideration, the House is much further
along in its hearings. The concentration here will therefore be on the
two House measures, H.R. 4 and H.R. 11750.
"Present Status of Proposals in Congress," Congressional
Digest
,




The Postal Policy Act of 1969
In January of 1969 President Johnson officially supported the
corporation reform proposal in his final State of the Union Message.
Upon assuming office, President Nixon turned the plan over to his Post-
master General, Winton M. Blount. By May both had become convinced
that the Kappel Commission's recommendations were sound. The President
then sent the measure to Congress with his strong endorsement. Repre-
sentative Morris K. Udall (D . Ariz.) introduced the bill as H.R. 11750,
entitled the "Postal Policy Act of 1969."
Organization
The Administration's bill establishes "The United States Postal
Service" under a corporate structure similar to that proposed by the
Kappel Commission. The Corporation is to be run by a nine man Board of
Directors. Seven of these will be appointed by the President, with
Senate confirmation. These seven will appoint an eighth member, desig-
nated the Chief Executive Officer, who will serve at the pleasure of
the Presidential appointees. The eighth will then choose an additional
member, designated the Chief Operating Officer. He will be subject to
removal by the other eight.
The presidentia lly appointed members are to serve seven year
terms with the first seven to be designated for staggered replacement
at one year intervals. They will serve part time and receive compensa-
tion at the annual rate of $5,000. In addition, they will receive $300
Details on this bill can be found in The Postal Service Act of
1969 which is for sale by the Government Printing Office in Committee
Print form complete with President Nixon's introductory remarks and an




for each Board meeting they attend and will be reimbursed for neces-
sary travel and subsistence expenses incurred in attending these
meetings
.
Both the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Operating Offi-
cer will have their tour of duty determined by the rest of the Board.
They will serve full time and be salaried as determined by the other
Board members. A ceiling is imposed at Level I of the Executive




The Corporation will be charged with the responsibility of pro-
viding such service as the public may wish at rates which allow a break
even operation for the Service as a whole. These include an efficient
system of collection and delivery, establishment of mail classes which
suit various groups of mailers, and the establishment of postal facili-
ties at such locations that patrons will have ready access to essential
postal services. To accomplish these ends, the Postal Service will be
empowered to prescribe postal rates; to provide needed facilities; to
provide for sale of stamps and other postage payment measures; to pro-
vide philatelic service; to provide, alter, or abolish special and non-
postal services; and to maintain an investigative arm to handle postal
offenses and civil and administrative matters.
U.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Revise the Laws Relating to
Post Offices and Post Roads, and for Other Purposes
,
H.R. 11750, 91st






Continuation of the military APO and FPO systems is authorized
within the new service. Maintenance of international postal agreements
is also authorized under the corporate name.
Personnel
Postal management will replace the Civil Service Commission and
Congress as the mainstay of employee matters in the proposed Corpora-
tion. Hiring, firing, training, pay, and benefits will all become pre-
rogatives of the Corporation.
All employees of the Post Office Department at the time the new
Corporation goes into effect will be given the option of moving to a
new job within the Civil Service framework or of transferring to the
new service with retention of all accrued benefits. Those who elect
transfer will no longer have any connection with the Civil Service Com-
mission in regard to their conditions of employment. They will, how-
ever, still be covered under the Civil Service retirement program, as
will all new employees. All pay scales and conditions of employment
in effect at the inception of the Postal Service will remain in effect
until modified by proper collective bargaining. Political considera-
tions are specifically excluded as a basis for appointments and promo-
tions at any level in the service, and severe penalties are provided
for violations of this provision. Residency requirements are also
abandoned
.
^This provision does not apply to the Postmaster General, the
Deputy Postmaster General, the Assistant Postmasters General, and the
General Counsel, all of whose positions will simply cease to exist.
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The language of the bill specifically releases Congress from
any further involvement in the labor-management process. This would
be the exclusive domain of the Postal Service and the employee unions.
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 would provide the basic
guidelines for negotiations.
Although expressing an intent that the parties themselves set
up procedures to handle disputes, Congress also provides a statutory
system that could be used. The proposed system is a nine member
Postal Disputes Panel whose salaries and expenditures would be borne
by the Postal Service. This Panel would consist of three members named
by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Director, three named by the
American Arbitration Association, and three chosen by the first six.
On matters referred to it, the Panel would be free to select from a
wide range of settlement techniques including such devices as mediation,
fact finding, recommendations, or binding arbitration. In the event
the issue went to arbitration, a three member arbitration board would
be established. One member would be selected by the labor representa-
tive, one by the Postal Service, and the third by the first two. After
hearing all pertinent evidence on both sides the board would issue a
decision binding on both parties. In line with the Kappel Commission's
recommendation, Postal Service employees would not be given the right
to strike.
It should be reemphasized that the above dispute procedure is
presented as a back up only. Congressional intent is that the parties
set up their own system.







H.R. 11750 attempts to sever postal finances from the budgetary
process. In its charter the Corporation will be authorized to adopt a
business type budget which will not be required to undergo the tedious
appropriations process. Until the Service achieves its goal of self
support, transitory appropriations will be necessary, but these grants
will not subject the total budget to detailed scrutiny. Congress will
maintain an overseer's position through an annual audit by GAO and a
required annual report of operations from the Postal Service.
The initial accounts of the Postal Service will essentially be
those of the Post Office Department at the time of the changeover.
Specific details will be worked out by GSA , the Bureau of the Budget,
and the Postal Service.
Free access to a revolving Postal Service Fund, to be estab-
lished in the Treasury, will be available to carry out the duties pre-
scribed for the Service. .This fund will be credited with the balance
in the Post Office Department Fund at the time of transfer and from that
point on would be the repository of all receipts by the Postal Service.
Neither the fund, nor any transitory appropriations paid to it, would
be subject to fiscal year limitations or apportionment provisions.
To raise revenue over and above its normal receipts, the Cor-
poration will be authorized to issue bonds up to an aggregate of $10
billion. Annual issues will be restricted to $1.5 billion increases
up to the $10 billion ceiling. The amount of issue, date of sale,




by the Postal Service's Board of Directors. Yield on the bonds will
be calculated so as to be not less than that prevailing on outstanding
Treasury issues of a similar maturity. All proposed issues will first
be submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury who may elect to purchase
them. The Postal Service may in fact require the Secretary to purchase
obligations up to a total of $2 billion. All issues not purchased by
the Treasury may be offered to other parties.
In the area of postal rates, H.R. 11750 specifies that the
goal is to achieve equity of costs and revenue within the next five
years. To this end, the determination of rates is left with postal
management
.
Classes of mail users who are to be given free or reduced rates
will be established through legislation. In the case of the reduced
rates, the actual charge will be set by the Corporation. To cover the
losses for these classes, Congress will be asked to provide an annual
appropriation to the Postal Fund. Should this appropriation not cover
losses (rate charged as compared with normal rate), the Postal Service
could adjust the rates of the privileged classes so that the appropri-
ation did equal the loss.
Rates in effect at the time of transfer will remain in effect
until changed by the Corporation. To provide the forum for orderly
hearings on proposed rate changes a panel of three rate commissioners
will be established. These commissioners will be chosen by the Board
from a Civil Service register and will be appointed to six year terms.
The initial three will serve two, four, and six years so as to permit
1 Ibid., p. 7!
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staggered relief. The salaries and expenses of the rate commissioners
will be borne by the Postal Service.
When a rate change is deemed necessary, the Board will simul-
taneously publish a complete description of the change in the Federal
Register and forward the same description to the rate commissioners.
Public hearings will then be scheduled and parties concerned invited
to testify before the commissioners or to submit written views. After
the hearings the panel will submit an opinion to the Board. The final
form of the proposal will then be submitted to both houses of Congress
and again printed in the Federal Register. It will take effect sixty
days after submission to Congress, unless disapproved by a concurrent
resolution of both the House and the Senate.
Proposals for service changes and complaints about rates or
service would be handled in a similar manner. All decisions would
also be subject to judicial review if sought by an offended party to
the proceedings. Any such actions would be brought against the Postal
Service and not against the United States.
In the area of transportation, the Postal Policy Act of 1969
also provides for some broadening of authority. Much freer use of
highway common carriers would replace the existing Star Route system
which awards exclusive four year contracts and seriously reduces flexi-
bility. Basic rates would be set by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC), but the Postal Service would be authorized to enter into






In the air, much greater freedom would be granted in areas
where carriers were either not certified by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) , or where certified carriers were not providing adequate
service. Where no certified carrier existed, the Postal Service would
be authorized to negotiate whatever contracts it desired, without CAB
approval. In the case of inadequate service, contracts with uncerti-
fied carriers would be subject to CAB review before becoming effective.
Interlude—Support and Oppositio n
to a U.S. Postal Corporation
As mentioned earlier, it is the basic question of organizational
form, more than any other issue, that divides those working for postal
reform. The corporation backers stress the business aspects while those
who back the status quo stress public service considerations.
The line up has the President and Postmaster General in favor
of the corporation while Congress at this point appears slightly bal-
anced against it. Postal ,unions are opposed. The Chamber of Commerce
of the United States and a new lobby, the Citizens Committee for Postal
Reform, are in favor. Large mailers are split.
The Administration's position follows closely the Kappel Com-
mission's thinking. The basic thrust is that the Post Office is pri-
marily a business, and that the corporation concept embodies the best
means of giving management the control and tools necessary to render
the services which that business is charged with providing.
The Citizens Committee for Postal Reform can hardly take any
course other than favoring the corporation plan. One of its co-chairmen,
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Lawrence F. O'Brien, was the Postmaster General who first proposed the
idea .
Corporation proponents point with great satisfaction to support
from the National Chamber of Commerce and such large mailers as Time,
Inc. The Chamber of Commerce conducted a poll before taking an offi-
cial stand and found that 96 per cent of their respondents favored the
proposed organizational shift. Time expects to be hurt by higher rates
at first but looks to long term gains through increased efficiency.
The American Business Press (111 companies producing 537 publications)
supports the plan on similar grounds. The Magazine Publishers Associa-
tion (125 companies publishing 400 magazines) has not yet taken a stand
on the issue.
Newspaper associations have been far less active in the debate
and are predominately undecided since the vast majority of newspapers
are either home delivered or sold on the streets. The Wall Street Jour-
nal, however, does depend 'on the mails and it has come out in favor of
the corporation plan.
It appears that the basic issue for second class mailers is
one of cost. Those who see long term efficiencies outweighing possible
increases in their rates, favor the Postal Corporation. Those who rely
heavily on the present rates, tend to be opposed.
Third class users apply the same economic criteria. They are
interested in the lowest possible costs for their bulk advertising.
1™Time, Inc. is the nation's largest private mail user.
"Mail Carriers and Users in Conflict over Postal Plan,"
Congressional Quarterly
,
June 17, 1969, pp '. 1-4.
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Most associations in this category have not taken an official stand but
there appears to be an undercurrent of opposition present.
The bulk of vocal opposition to the Postal Corporation resides
in the employee unions. Their arguments are based on two main consider-
ations. The first is in the area of service; the second in labor-
management relations.
The unions envision the corporation pursuing its goal of break
even operations with such fervor that it loses sight of the public
interest. They point to the record of the Bell Telephone System which
has monopoly rights over 80 per cent of the population but has chosen
to serve only about 20 per cent by concentrating on large urban areas
and refusing to go into the countryside. Similar cutbacks in rural
mail delivery are predicted. Several counters to this argument are put
forth by corporation buffs. They believe that rural services, even
though unprofitable in themselves, add greatly to the overall value of
the postal service to its customers. They envision no cutback and
point to structural safeguards in the proposed legislation. The Con-
gress will charter the corporation and establish at that point what
services are to be provided. Changes in these services would have to
be submitted to public hearings by the rate commissioners and then
approved by the Board of Directors before taking effect. This is, in
fact, a far more stringent requirement than exists now in the Cabinet
structure. At present, the Postmaster General is free to unilaterally
curtail service without anyone's approval.
'"Should Congress Proceed Now to Establish a U.S. Postal
Corporation," Congressional Digest, March, .1969, p. 85.
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Concern over labor-management procedures is also a reason for
union opposition. The entire century to date has been spent building
what has become a powerful lobby for postal employees. The corporation
threatens that institution and faces the unions with the prospect of
starting anew and having to develop new skills at the negotiating
table. Union leaders feel that postal reform can improve their lot
without forcing this change. They feel that if they lose their direct
access to Congress they should be given something in return. Most are
campaigning for the right to strike but some appear willing to settle
for a direct access to binding third party arbitration with elimination
of the intermediate Postal Disputes Panel now proposed. While the
right to strike will not be easily won, there appears a good chance
binding arbitration could be achieved if the corporation becomes fact.
Corporation proponents believe that, despite the change of
orientation required, the unions would fare better under their plan.
With the present personnel system as bad as described in the Kappel
Commission report, there seems to be some value in their position. In
addition, of course, they feel the new system is essential to effective
management control of postal costs.
Strong opposition to the corporation is also found within Con-
gress. Opponents here seem mostly concerned with preservation of Con-
gressional influence in postal operations. At present, opposition is
centered in Representative Thaddeus J. Dulski (D. New York), the Chair-
man of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. It is his
bill, H.R. 4, which stands as the first major stumbling block to
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corporation legislation. His position will be examined, with his bill,
in the following section.
H.R. 4--An Alternative
While President Johnson studied the Kappel report, Congress was
also at work on postal reform. On the opening day of the 91st Congress,
before Johnson's position could be officially aired, and, even more
critically, before the Nixon administration even took office, Repre-
sentative Dulski introduced his own proposed legislation. His bill,
H.R. 4, while agreeing with the basic findings of the Kappel Commission,
took radical departure from their primary recommendation. Mr. Dulski
feels that total postal reform is possible within the existing Cabinet
structure, and frames his bill with this basic assumption. This section
will examine the details of H.R. 4 in the basic areas of management and
organization, personnel, and finances. In each case the examination
will conclude with a contrast with the corresponding provisions of
H.R. 11750.
Organization and Management
Chairman Dulski's plan calls for continuation of the Post Office
as an executive department structure that Dulski feels will give manage-
ment the flexibility and control it needs. These include the creation
of a Postal Modernization Authority and a Commission on Postal Finances.





Aside from the obvious distinction of a corporate structure
versus that of an executive department, there are two basic differences
in organizational approach between H.R. 4 and H.R. 11750. The first
concerns the selection process for Postmaster General and the second
the question of management continuity.
As a Cabinet member, the Postmaster General would seem to need
the qualities of a good political policy maker. In fact, however, more
than one Postmaster General has expressed a feeling of uneasiness and
time wasted at Cabinet meetings. He has nothing to contribute to
national policy. His job is to carry out the policy decisions of Con-
gress as they relate to postal service. This policy has been unchanged
for years: the best possible service at the lowest possible cost.
H.R. 11750 recognizes this distinction and seeks long term business
managers for its Fostal Service. H.R. 4 persists in the four year
political appointment.
Continuity is frequently noted as a support for H.R. 11750.
The operating management under that bill are given indefinite terms of
office. The other seven Board members are assigned rotating seven year
tours. Given capable Chief Executive and Chief Operating Officers,
this means that only one Board member out of nine would change each
year. In contrast the entire top management structure of the Post
2Office Department turns over with each new administration.
-•-A strange sidelight here is that the Postmaster General is
the only Cabinet member who requires reappointment at the end of four
years even if there is no change in the Presidency.
2 The Postmaster General, the Deputy Postmaster General, six
Assistant Postmasters General, and the General Counsel. In addition
to this Washington hierarchy, all Regional Directors and many lesser
positions also turn over.
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A final management distinction between the two bills is in the
area of employee wages and postal rates. Under H.R. 11750 both of
these functions are handled by postal management. H.R. 4 leaves the
wage question in Congress and assigns the bulk of rate setting to the
proposed Commission on Postal Finances. This approach seems to further
fragment, rather than consolidate, control. Both the wage and the rate
question will be further examined in appropriate sections to follow.
Personnel
The basic personnel structure under H.R. 4 would remain that
of Civil Service. Improved procedures are presented in labor-management
relations and a Postal Labor-Management Relations Panel is established.
In the event of disputes, either party is free to invoke the aid of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Should this effort fail to
achieve settlement, the Postal Labor-Management Relations Panel may be
called in. This Panel will consist of a chairman and two additional
members, all appointed by the President, with Senate approval. All mem-
bers will be appointed to rotating five year terms. Matters referred
to the Panel and subsequently decided by it would be binding on both
1parties
.
Grievances would be handled according to procedures established
through negotiation between postal management and the union representing
the employee involved. Should these procedures not result in a satis-
factory settlement, the matter would be referred by the Post Office
U.S. Congress, House, A Bill to Modernize the United States
Postal Establishment, to Provide for Efficient and Economical Postal
Service to the Public, to Improve Postal Employee-Management Relations
and for Other Purposes
,




Department to a Department of Labor arbitrator. His decision would be
final and binding.
Procedures almost identical to those described above are also
provided for supervisors and supervisor's organizations.
Measures to eliminate political influence are also contained
in the Dulski Bill. As with H.R. 11750, severe penalties are pre-
scribed for violation of these provisions.
Contrast
Perhaps the most impoi'tant distinction in the personnel field
is that H.R. 4 leaves Congress with the wage setting responsibility
for postal employees. Under that system the Post Office would still
be without control over its largest cost item. H.R. 11750, on the
other hand, gives the Postal Service management a free hand in nego-
tiating directly with the unions on wages and related benefits.
Proponents of the Postal Service Act (H.R. 11750) also point
with distaste to the statutory recognition of collective bargaining
procedures for supervisors. They feel this will drive supervisors
away from management. Under the Postal Service Act, supervisors would
be given recognition and responsibilities as managers rather than rank
and file employees.
Dispute procedures also differ. H.R. 11750 requires an initial
submission of the issue to the Postal Disputes Panel, which may decide
against arbitration. Corporation supporters praise the uncertainty of
this procedure and claim it will encourage settlement of disputes at
lower levels. Opponents (especially the unions themselves) demand the
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right of direct arbitration, as what they feel is a balance of power
mechanism. It appears they have what may be an unreasonable fear of
a management bias on the Postal Disputes Panel.
Finances
It is in the financial realm that H.R. 4 makes its most far
reaching reform attempts. Problems of access to revenue, rate setting,
transportation, and capital expansion arc treated. Transportation
improvement are similar to those of the Postal Act and will not be
rehashed.
To handle capital expansion, as well as the administration of
all existing Post Office facilities, a Postal Modernization Authority
is created. This Authority will be a government corporation headed by
the Postmaster General and an Executive Director appointed by him.
All Post Office property would be held in the corporate name and leased
to the Post Office Department.
To finance required improvements and expansion the Authority
will have the power to issue bonds to a limit of $20 billion. These
issues will be subject to approval by the. Secretary of the Treasury
only as regards the date of sale and the maximum rate of interest to
be paid. In the event of failure of the Secretary to approve these
terms, provisions are made for interim sales to the Treasury. These
interim sales are limited to a total Treasury holding of $500 million
and are to be written for a one year maturity.
Also established in H.R. 4 is a Post Office Department Operating
Fund. This fund will receive all revenues of the Post Office and will
1 Ibid., p. 29.
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be available to the Postmaster General for paying Department expenses.
In addition, it will be the repository for Congressional appropria-
tions for public service aspects of postal operations and any deficit
the Department may incur.
The final measure proposed by H.R. 4 to improve financial
management deals with removal of the rate setting process from Con-
gressional authority. To this end, a Commission on Postal Finance
is set up to operate every four years for an eighteen month period.
This Commission will consist of eleven members appointed from private
life. Five will be appointed by the President, and three each by the
Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate.^
These appointees are authorized to appoint an Executive Director and
to add such additional staff as they feel appropriate.
Each Commission so appointed would be charged with review of
the entire financial structure of the Post Office. This process would
include a review of rates on all class of mail, an identification of
public service aspects and related costs, an evaluation of the cost
accounting procedures in use, and a check on the operation and admin-
istration of the Postal Modernization Authority. Upon completion of
their review, the Commission would submit a report and recommendations
to the President who in turn would submit proposed action to Congress.
This proposal would take effect in four months if not previously dis-









Probably the most important financial difference between the
two bills is in the area of rate setting. H.R. 11750 gives this power
directly to postal management; whereas H.R. 4 gives it to the President
through a Commission on Postal Finance. Many believe this latter
course to be a step backward since it completely segregates wage deci-
sions (the major postal cost item) and rate decisions (the major
revenue source). They argue that even the present system keeps these
functions in the same body (Congress) and has, at least, the potential
for coordinating the two.
Other criticisms compare the expertise and timeliness of the
two approaches to rate setting. Under H.R. 11750, the Commissioners
would be selected from qualified applicants on a Civil Service register
and would serve full time for six year terms. H.R. 4 would leave
selection to the President and Congressional leadership and would
establish a Commission which existed for eighteen months every four
years. Critics maintain that the latter procedure does not insure
selection of the best qualified personnel, does not allow fox* the
building of expertise through experience, and fails to recognize the
need for a more timely adjustment of rates than the four year- cycle
permits
.
Both measures recognize the need for an ability to raise funds
apart from the appropriations process now in effect. Notably, H.R. 4
has a bond limit twice that of H.R. 11750 ($20 billion versus $10
^U.S. Congress, House, Postmaster General Blount testifying
before the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, 91st Cong.,
August 12, 1969 (Post Office Department Reprint), p. 5.
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billion) . Aside from the institutional difference (separate Postal
Modernization Authority as opposed to an overall Postal Corporation)
,
the major distinction in the bond process is the amount that the Trea-
sury can be required to purchase. Under H.R.. 4 it is $500,000; under
H.R. 11750 it is $2 billion.
Status of the Two Approaches
From the beginning, supporters of the Postal Policy Act knew
they were in for a struggle. Their bill was late on the scene and the
opposing measure had been introduced by the chairman of the very com-
mittee which would consider the reforms. Action in the House, thus
far, has been concentrated on H.R. 4 and amendments to that measure.
Support for the Postal Policy Act (H.R. 11750) is, however, growing.
As late as mid-August, 1969, it was conceded only about six votes in
the House Committee. When tested in an October vote, however, it
resulted in a thirteen to thirteen tie in an attempt to substitute
o
H.R. 11750 for H.R. 4. With nearly a year left in the 91st Congress,
neither side is ready to concede although Chairman Dulski's bill Con-
's
tinues as the front runner.
A Compromise
Since the beginning of this study a compromise bill has been
drafted. It is entitled the "Postal Reform and Salary Adjustment Act
Willard Clopton, Jr., "Postal Corporation is Parley Theme,"
The Washington Post
,
August 16, 1969, p. C9.
2
"Citizens Urged to Write," The Postal Reformer, October,
1969, p. 3
3See later developments in the next- section of this chapter.
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of 1970," and incorporates several items that are intended to win over
those who oppose H.R. 11750.
The first concession made is the omission of the word corpora-
tion. The new postal service would be called the United States Postal
Service Authority. An examination of the proposed bill, however,
reveals that with one exception the structure under consideration is
that of a government owned corporation. Management in the Authority
would reside in an Executive Council of thirteen members with broad
authority over postage rates, pay scales, postal services, and
finances. Under H.R. 11750 these same functions would have been per-
formed by a nine member Board of Directors. The name change of this
governing body is insignificant. What is important is the increase in
number. Nine of the members would be chosen in the same manner as
2
under the original corporation bill, but the remaining four would be
appointed from the United States Congress.-^ Despite this concession
to Congressional interests* Post Office officials candidly admit that
the basic structure is that of a government corporation. The general
powers listed for the Authority are identical to those previously
'"Highlights of the New Reform Bill," The Postal Reformer
,
February 6, 1970.
2 Seven appointed by the President and two others chosen by
these seven.
3U.S. Congress, House, A Bill to modernize the United States
Postal Service, to provide for efficient and economical postal service
to the public, to improve postal emp loyee-management relations, and
for other purposes
,
91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 9.
Interviews with anonymous Post Office officials, Washington,
D.C. , 11 March 1970.
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listed for the corporation. In addition, the Authority will be sub-
ject to the Government Corporation Control Act.
Another compromise on this bill exists in the personnel area.
Here there will be a new career postal service but it will remain within
the Civil Service framework. Wages, however, will become a subject for
negotiation rather than Congressional determination. As an additional
concession to the postal unions, a postal pay raise is incorporated in
the bill. 5
The final significant compromise exists in the formation of a
thirteen member Advisory Board. This group would consist of the Direc-
tor General and the Deputy Director General of the Authority plus eleven
additional Presidential appointees-- four representing postal labor, four
representing major mailers, and three representing the public at large.
Its function will be to advise the Executive Council on rates, services,
and employee compensation.
Aside from these three compromise areas and several insignifi-
cant name changes in some of the operating and advisory elements of the
service, the compromise measure conforms closely to the corporation
bill, H.R. 11750. Both measures provide the following critical reforms:
1Ibid.
2














1. The service is removed from the Cabinet and the Congressional
appropriations process.
2. Wages are subject to collective bargaining.
3. Rates are set through a panel of expert rate commissioners.
4. Authority for financing through bond issuance is provided.
In a surprise move on March 12, 1970, the House Post Office and
Civil Service Committee voted seventeen to six to approve this compro-
mise bill. Thus the corporation plan, although it still faces opposi-
tion on the House floor and in the Senate, seems to have overcome its
first major Congressional hurdle.




"House Panel, in Surprise Step, Approves a Postal Reform Plan
Similar to Nixon's," The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1970, p. 6.

CHAPTER V
A LOOK AT EXISTING COMPETITION
Having viewed the question of a postal corporation, in terms
of the present legislative alternatives, the discussion will now be
expanded to touch on the question of a privately operated, federally
regulated postal service. It must be remembered that the Kappel
Commission rejected this idea primarily because of the difficulties
in initial financing. Let's look then at present competition in
those areas not under Post Office monopoly.
The Independent Postal System of America (IPSA)
Drawing on the Kappel Commission's findings that nearly three-
2quarters (74 per cent) of all mail is originated by businesses, the
private sector is trying to exploit the businessman's desire for economy
and reliability of service by offering him an alternative delivery
system.
Perhaps the most ambitious recent effort in this regard is
being made by an Oklahoma City based firm called The Independent Postal
System of America (IPSA). Founded in February of 1968, this endeavor
is presently concentrating on the highly profitable "junk" mail segment
•
^Report of the President's Commission on Postal Organization
,
Frederick R. Kappel, chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1968), p. 2.




of the market but intends to expand operations into both the second
(newspapers and magazines) and fourth (parcels) class areas. The
system's founder and president, Tom Murray, has found his guaranteed
delivery, lower rate service to be highly attractive to clients. Such
large mailers as Sears, Montgomery Ward, J. C. Penny, Kroger, Western
Auto and McCrory have largely abandoned the U.S. mails for their cata-
log and advertising needs in areas where IPSA service is available.
Starting with 27 carriers and a single mail truck, Murray's
operation has now spread to over 60 cities in 34 states and employs
1,500 bonded carriers. The system is run on a franchise arrangement
and currently has almost 2,000 additional applications in process.
Franchising was chosen primarily because it was the most rapid means
of expansion available, but also because Murray felt that the $50,000
required would help insure efficiency at the local level.
IPSA operations should reach all fifty states within another
year. Murray foresees revenue of $2 billion by 1975 and employee
strength of 500,000 within a decade. To handle this growth plans
call for 30,000 delivery trucks, an airline, and an $18 million com-
-5
puter complex to link the anticipated 4,000 IPSA stations.
One of IPSA's biggest problems at present is recruiting a
labor force. About one- third of the present personnel strength con-
sists of college students and housewives working part time. The pay
"Tom Murray to Run Longest Race Yet," Generation , September,
1969, p. 20.
2 Sterling F. Green, "Private Postal System is Found Less
Costly," The Washington Post
,






scale is presently slightly below that of the average postal employee,
but Murray plans to have it on an equal footing within a year.
Because of IPSA, an interesting sidelight of the "Postal
Monopoly" will soon be challenged in court. It appears that it is
illegal for anyone but the U.S. Post Office Department to put anything
in a residential mailbox. Murray contends that the mailbox is the
homeowner's property and open to anyone to whom he (the owner) grants
access. In the interim IPSA uses plastic bags which attach to door-
knobs. A potential loss on this item was turned to profit by selling
advertising space on the bags.
Parcel Service
The original intent of Congress in 1912 when it established
parcel post service seems to have been the exploitation of revenue pro-
ducing possibilities along certain routes only. During the course of
deliberations however the service was extended to give nation-wide
coverage. This decision eventually allowed private competition to
concentrate on the more profitable areas while the Post Office had to
fashion its rate structure to fit a much larger base. Since there is
no postal monopoly in this class of mail, the Post Office is required
to cover all costs with its revenue. Despite somewhat of a disadvan-
tage in rates, the Post Office does in practice provide a competitive











It is in the area of service that the. Post Office is losing
ground to such agencies as Greyhound, Railway Express (REA) and United
Parcel Service (UPS). The Post Office requires almost all senders
(even large mailers) to deposit their parcels at the Post Office and
provides no reliable delivery schedule. Greyhound requires delivery
to and pick up from their terminals but has a highly reliable three
day service anywhere in the continental United States. REA has a far
less certain schedule, but does provide pick up and delivery services.
UPS concentrates on businesses rather than individuals and seems able
to provide them the best service. It provides both a reliable schedule
and pick up and delivery. UPS presently operates in thirty- seven states
o
and has applications submitted for extension into nine others.
One of the major problems facing the Post Office in the parcel
service is that of transportation. Most parcels go via surface trans-
portation which for the most part means by rail. Whereas the decline
of the U.S. railroad service was overcome in the case of letters by
use of the "airlift" concept, the costs involved in airlifting parcels
is too high. Thus the parcel is, at least for the present, destined
3to continue on the railroads despite some unreliability of service.
Private mailers overcome this difficulty by the use of common carriers











The requirement for delivery of parcels to the Post Office
for mailing also has an adverse effect on other patrons. A frequent
customer complaint about the Post Office is the long waiting period
encountered in conducting business in a Post Office lobby. While it
is certainly not the sole cause of this delay, the relatively compli-




At present only about 1 per cent of Post Office volume consists
of parcels. Of that 1 per cent, only 10 per cent involves individuals
mailing. Using an approximate total mail volume of eighty billion
pieces, this means that each man, woman and child in the U.S. origi-
nates less than one parcel shipment every two years. The remainder
of the eight hundred million parcels is business originated.
With the existence of organizations such as the United Parcel
Service and Railway Express, the question of whether the Post Office
ought even to continue in the parcel business arises. In many cases
where there is a choice of service, businessmen seem to prefer the
privately owned service. Because of the small volume involved, justi-
fication from a public service standpoint must be questioned.
The possibility that the mails, and in particular parcel post,
help to subsidize the railroads needs also to be considered. The
existence of such a subsidy is not in question. From their earliest
years the railroads have been helped by the mail service they provided.
There is also little, doubt that the railroads are. presently in need of
President's Commission, p. 89,
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financial help. But why should the Post Office conduct what is essen-
tially a business operation merely to subsidize railroads? Surely a
direct subsidy would be more efficient.
These arguments for reduction or elimination of parcel post
service are, of course, not conclusive. Rather they suggest issues
which need further examination if the Post Office is to successfully
cope with this troublesome problem.
In contrast to parcel service, "junk mail" holds a substantial
volume of nearly 23 per cent of the eighty billion total pieces of
2
mail. Again, however, the existence of efficient, willing, private
competitors must raise the question of its value as a federal service.
This segment of the mail is exclusively business originated and has,
therefore, little claim to a public service justification. Distribu-
tion is generally local, so there is no transportation subsidy argu-
ment. Although advertising in general is a stimulant to the economy,
this hardly appears reason'for the Post Office to engage in it. Other
agencies are directly charged with economic stimulation. Present indi-
cations are that the private sector can provide the service economi-
3
cally. If this is the case, the economy would perhaps be better
stimulated (and federal funds best preserved) by yielding this service
to the private sector as rapidly as it can handle it.
The mailing of newspapers and magazines is an area that has not
seen effective private competition. Nonetheless, especially in light
1 Ibid
.









of IPSA's announced intention to go into this aspect, it too bears
questioning. At one time in our history the newspaper was the sole
means of mass communications. As such it was viewed as a valuable
public service and carried at preferential rates in the mail system.
This value, while still present, has decreased with the supplement
available through radio and television. Many magazines, which also
enjoy reduced bulk rates, are relaxation oriented and largely com-
mercial in extent.
Summary
In its report on the Post Office the Kappel Commission
remarked, "Were the postal system being started today, it might well
be operated by a privately- owned regulated corporation not unlike the
companies which operate other communications and transportation ser-
vices in this country."^ Their rejection of this organization form
was not on ideological grounds but rather on the basis of financial
considerations. It was felt that no private concern would be willing
(or able?) to totally assume a business with requirements for such
vast capital expansion and a history of large operating deficits.
Nonetheless, since they attributed only 3.8 per cent of total postal
costs to public service aspects of the service, they suggested that

















This chapter has shown that there are at least some aspects of
postal services that are being successfully pursued by the private
sector. It is recognized, of course, that the examples cited are not
regulated in the public utility sense that the Kappel Commission
envisioned. They are highly profit oriented and concentrate almost
exclusively in large urban areas. Were these services (or the total
postal system) turned over to the private sector this situation would
be intolerable. The possibility exists however, that at some future
date the Post Office will become financially sound enough to interest
the private sector in a partial or total takeover on a regulated
utility basis. Should this day arrive, the question of continuation
as a public service rather than as a public utility must be reexamined
Partial in the sense of complete operation of some aspect of





This study opened with the basic research question of whether
or not the Post Office ought to be reorganized as a government cor-
poration. In pursuing this question, several underlying issues were
examined. It seems proper, then, that before addressing the basic
question, each of these other issues be considered.
Efficiency and Effectiveness
In considering the question of Post Office efficiency, there
appear to be two levels of thought. To the average citizen, service
seems adequate. He uses the mails primarily for business transactions,
and probably gives little thought to a six cent postage for delivery
anywhere in the country. The image of the Post Office for the average
American is not that of an Executive Department in Washington, but
rather that of his local Post Office and, more particularly, his own
postman. In general, that image is good.
Objectively, or at least as objectively as such bodies as
Congress, the Kappel Commission, large mail users, and others can view
it, the image is different. To them, while service may be good, it is
Report of the President's Commission on Postal Organization
,
Frederick R. Kappel, chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing





not nearly as good as it could and should be. The postal deficit is
a very real itera at this level. It means that roughly a billion dol-
lars a year is being drained from the U.S. Treasury, or, more con-
cretely, from programs such as urban renewal, medical research, educa-
tion, pollution control, and welfare.
Aside from the deficit, these groups see a sorry capital
structure in the Post Office. Buildings are old and poorly located,
equipment purchases are not keeping pace with technological advance-
ments ; research and development is just beginning.
At the root of these problems, there lives an ineffective man-
agement. This condition exists not through any fault of the managers
themselves, but rather because of controls held by groups outside the
Post Office Department. Effective management tools simply do not exist
for the Post Office. 5
It seems, then, that the postal service is not doing so well.
There may or may not be breakdowns similar to that in Chicago in 1966,
but it appears that without some sort of reform a postal deficit and a
system of administration rather than management is certain to continue.
'The Kappel Commission, for instance, conservatively estimates






-'This is the "no control" concept discussed in Chapter III .
/
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Business Enterprise, Public Service, or Both
As pointed out in Chapter II, the Post Office has served a
variety of purposes over the years. Started as a source of revenue
for the British Crown, it has journeyed through periods as a stimulant
for infant transportation industries, and of support for public news
media. Now, however, the need for these latter uses is being questioned
There are other reliable modes of communications available; transporta-
tion is no longer an infant and, although it still needs help, there
are programs of direct aid available; the paper news media is not the
single vital source of information it was in the days before radio and
television.
With some of these early purposes being debated, the public
service argument for the Post Office is greatly weakened. It is cer-
tainly a vital service, but so are electric, water, gas, and telephone
service. True public service exists only when private parties are
unable or unwilling to provide a vital need or are unable to provide
it as well as the government. It must then be provided by the govern-
ment as a public service. The rise of competition in some areas of
postal service seems to indicate a desire by the private sector to
provide this service. The Kappel Commission believed that private
enterprise was the proper setting for the Post Office. The organiza-
tion they envisioned was that of a regulated public utility. This
concept was rejected only because in its present financial state no
one would be willing to accept the Post Office.
President's Commission, pp. 53-54.-
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There are some areas of public service in the Post Office.
Items such as free or reduced rates for the blind, educational insti-
tutions, and non-profit organizations are services properly provided
by the public sector. The question remains, however , whether such
items are large enough to merit labeling the entire Post Office func-
tion a public service.
Business aspects of the Post Office are more clearly seen.
Service is provided to identifiable patrons for a specified charge.
The greatest users of the mail are businessmen. The bulk of mail
n
itself is business oriented. These facts are not easily dismissed
when considering the business nature of the Post Office.
It appears that the public service identification of the Post
Office is the result of inertia. The service has always been pro-
vided by the Federal Government. Such a long tradition establishes
a public service orientation that may be hard to overcome.
The Postal Deficit
Defined simply, the postal deficit is the excess of costs over
revenues. It is the composition of this deficit that is of interest.
Part of it results from deliberate subsidizing of portions of the ser-
vice; part from the inability of present rates to cover associated
costs. The first part of the deficit is written off as a public ser-








The Kappcl Commission devoted considerable study to the public
service allowances. Their conclusions showed a "true" ratio of about
four to one between operating losses and public service allowances.
The two largest items redefined were the rural allowance and the
accounting basis for calculating the subsidy figures.
The loss on operation of rural post offices is presently con-
sidered a public service, loss. The very existence of a postal service
in rural areas, however, creates value throughout the system. The
loss, then, is better thought of as a subsidy to the system as a whole
rather than as a public service allowance.
In calculating subsidies, the present practice is to compare
the rate charged with the fully allocated costs of providing it. This
practice neglects the fact that even normal rates may not be covering
full costs. The proper basis for a subsidy should, therefore, be the
difference between the rate charged and the normal rate. The excess
2
is a deficiency in rates riot a public service allowance.
With these two adjustments, and smaller ones in the areas of
special and non- postal services, the operating loss assumes a far
greater proportion of the deficit. In other words inefficiency plays
a larger role.
Financing the Deficit
The question of how to finance the postal deficit is closely
interwoven with the definition of the deficit and the public service








service, it would seem entirely reasonable to finance all losses out
of general tax revenue. Having defined postal activities as primarily
business in nature, this reasoning breaks down. Under a business
orientation, only those items identifiable as public services should
be financed. All other losses should be eliminated by a combination
of increased internal efficiencies and an adequate rate structure.
As for financing the public service areas, three courses seem
open. They could be tax financed; they could be changed to direct
grants from the appropriate government agency to the institutions con-
cerned; or they could be borne by the postal system as a whole without
recourse to the tax structure. I favor the direct subsidy as the
best approach. The inclusion in the Post Office budget of what is
essentially a subsidy from some other agency seems to unduly complicate
an already involved federal government. Were this approach not accepted,
I would have a strong preference for the absorption by rates over the
tax mechanism. The extra cost to the service would seem a small price
to pay for the chance to avoid completely the Congressional appropria-
tions process. It should be noted, however, that both legislative pro-
posals studied in this paper have resorted to tax financing for public
service allowances. Perhaps the timing is not yet right for a complete
break from the tax structure.
Reform Possibilities
Having set the background, the basic question can now be con-




is a government corporation the best vehicle for that reform? At the
present time, I believe it is.
Reform is, of course, possible in almost any organizational
form. As will be recalled from Chapter III, the Kappel Commission's
basic charge was to seek the structure which could best house effective
reform. In pursuing its task, the Commission considered a continuum
spreading from a privately owned, government regulated corporation to
retention of the present Cabinet status. Within these limits were
three other alternatives--a postal agency, a government corporation,
and a government corporation with maximum private participation. The
major concern of this paper has been an examination of the two extremes
and of the mid-range concept of a government- owned corporation. Before
reexamining those possibilities, a brief discussion of the two remain-
ing options is in order.
The postal agency can best be described as a compromise between
the Cabinet and the corporate structure. Its advocates recognize that
postal service is not a major function of the Federal Government but
n
still feel that it should be a government service activity. They see
a more concentrated approach to management control through the use of
devices such as revolving funds for both operations and capital budget-
ing. Critics of this approach claim it falls short of addressing the
real issues and that it weakens present Congressional control without
providing suitable economic substitutes. They point to the facts that
"Options Considered by the Kappel Commission," Congressional
Digest
,
March, 1969, pp. 72-74.
President's Commission
,
Annex 1, p. 192.
3 Ibid., p. 193.
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replenishment of both revolving funds would still be subject to the
appropriations process, that Congress would still control wages and
rates, and that break-even operation would not. be an objective.
These conditions would lead to a continued disolution of management
and a possible erosion of protection for the public interest as the
o
administrators pushed their own special interests.
This alternative was not subjected to detailed scrutiny in
this paper for two reasons. First, it does not sufficiently address
the real issues of operation as a public service versus operation as
a business, and public versus private operation. Secondly, it was an
option rejected by the Kappel Commission and is not now the subject
of proposed legislation.
A government corporation with maximum use of private partici-
pation is the other alternative which has not received detailed study
here. This form is identical to the corporation plan described in
Chapter IV with one major exception. Under this plan widespread use
o
of private contractors would be encouraged. Acceptance of such a
plan would, of course, presuppose a leaning toward the corporate
structure and a rejection of complete private operation. Thus, while
it may still be an acceptable option, it was not studied here because
it compromises the issue of private versus public operation and, again,







These leave us with the two options presented in Chapter IV--
reform within the existing structure and change to a government cor-
poration—and the third discussed in Chapter V--a private operation.
Reform within the Executive Department setting is the reform alterna-
tive offered by Representative Dulski in H.R. 4. Although this
measure would undoubtedly result in some degree of better postal per-
formance, it falls short of the change needed in several key areas.
While finances would be vastly improved through Dulski' s Revolving
Fund and Postal Modernization Authority, the major cost item (pay)
and the major revenue item (postage) would still be controlled by
forces outside the Post Office. Thus the "Postal Complex" with its
dispersed management would continue to exist. The retention of
Congressional wage setting also strips Post Office management of an
o
opportunity to establish effective collective bargaining. A vital
need for continuity of top level management is also neglected by this
approach. The Postmaster General and his principal assistants would
continue to be political appointees with their term in office condi-
tioned by their party's ability to retain the White House.
The corporation proposal on the other hand presents its case
by stressing consolidated management control. Under this form, Post
Office management would have operating control over all its revenue
President's Commission
,
Annex 1, p. 188.
U.S., Congress, House, Postmaster General Blount speaking
before the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, 91st Cong
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and cost items. It would operate as the business oriented entity it
is, but still serve the public interest by responding to policy guide-
lines and reviews established by the Congress. The point to be noted
is that as long as the Post Office performs effectively and efficiently
in this next role, its day to day management will not be infringed upon.
The corporation proposal also provides a basis for meaningful collective
bargaining by inclusion of wages as a negotiable item. Continuity is
provided in a board of directors. Seven of these serve staggered seven
year terms, while two are permanently appointed, full-time, operating
2
managers removable only for cause.
Further general support for the corporation concept (although
not in reference to the Post Office) is given by two noted administrators-
C. H. Pritchett (one of the original directors of the TVA) and Harry S.
3Truman. Pritchett listed the corporation advantages as follows:
1. Financially autonomous, thus escaping the strict financial
framework of ordinary government agencies.
2. Semi- private status confers some degree of freedom from many
government regulations that tend to sacrifice efficiency for
scrupulous legality.
3. Board of Directors—General Manager concept which provides
long term expertise and avoids political influence.
4. Limits in various degrees the sovereign immunity of the Fed-
eral Government when it undertakes a commercial venture. For
example the corporation can be so chartered that it is subject
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5. Administrative decentralization and local autonomy.
In his 1948 budget message President Truman commented on the proper
uses of government corporations:
Experience indicates that the corporate form of organization is
peculiarly adapted to the administration of governmental programs
which are predominantly of a commercial character-- those which
are revenue producing, or at least potentially self-sustaining,
and involve a large number of business- type transactions with the
public
.
In their business operations such programs require greater
flexibility than the customary type of appropriation budget
ordinarily permits. As a rule the usefulness of a corporation
lies in its ability to deal with the public in the manner
employed by private business for similar work.
In retrospect, this description seems an exact fit for the Post Office.
A final consideration must now be made of the extreme option
of complete private operation under federal regulation. As noted in
Chapter V, this option is both financially and politically moot. The
public sector will not give it up and the private sector doesn't want
it. I submit, however, that these factors may change and that this
alternative should be kept in mind for the future as suggested by the
Kappel Commission.
The solution for the present, then, must be a postal corpora-
tion with the threefold goal of providing dependable service respon-
sive to the public's needs, eliminating all but public service portions
of the postal deficit, and providing better working conditions and
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